

Department of State

TELEGRAM

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CINCPAC FOR POLAD

EXCISE

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, PINS, PINT, AF, PGOV

SUBJ: AFGHAN INTERNAL AFFAIRS: A 1974 ASSESSMENT

1. SUMMARY: EIGHTEEN MONTHS HAVE PASSED SINCE MOHAMMAD DAUD AND HIS ASSOCIATES REMOVED AFGHANISTAN'S MONARCHY. WITH THIS COUNTRY'S COMPLICATED PAST AS PROLOGUE AND INTRICATE DOMESTIC MAKE-UP AS THE SETTING, DAUD HAS BEGUN EFFORTS TO MODERNIZE THE COUNTRY. HE HAS GONE FORWARD ESPECIALLY DURING THE PAST TWELVE MONTHS IN GETTING HOLD OF MOST IF NOT ALL THE POWER ELEMENTS AVAILABLE: HE FOLLOWED ABOLITION OF THE MONARCHY, CONSTITUTION AND PARLIAMENT WITH FIRM AND, WE BELIEVE, SUCCESSFUL EFFORTS TO CONTROL THE "CENTRAL COMMITTEE"

(WITH WHICH HE ROSE TO POWER) THE CABINET AND THE BUREAUCRACY, AND, SUCH OTHER FACTORS OF MODERN AFGHANISTAN AS THE UNIVERSITY AND THE BUSINESS-BANKING COMMUNITY. IN THESE EFFORTS HE WAS

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AND IS SUSTAINED BY THE COUNTRY'S ARMED FORCES, WHO HOLD HIGH REGARD FOR HIM STILL FROM HIS 1953-1963 TENURE AS PRIME MINISTER, BY HIS GODFATHERLY POSITION IN THE INFLUENTIAL MOHAMMADZAI FAMILY, AND BY A SIZABLE AND AMORPHOUS SECURITY-INTELLIGENCE OUTFIT LARGELY OF HIS OWN CREATION. HAVING WORKED TO ACHIEVE COMPLETE CONTROL OF THE COUNTRY, DAUD NOW APPEARS INCREASINGLY READY TO LAUNCH INTO DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS AND EXPLOIT GENEROUS AID PROMISES MADE DURING 1974. (SEPTEL DESCRIBES AFGHAN DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS AND SUCCESS IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND AID FIELD.) A LARGE FACTOR IN DAUD'S POLITICAL FUTURE WILL BE THE SUCCESS OF THESE DEVELOPMENT EFFORTS AND THE TIMING OF THEIR BRINGING APPRECIABLE BENEFIT TO THE POPULATIONS, ESPECIALLY THE POLITICALLY AWARE TOWN-CITY POPULATIONS OF THE COUNTRY. IN THIS PRESIDENT DAUD MUST STEP LIVELY, FOR THE EFFECTS OF WORLD INFLATION AND OTHER PROBLEMS NOT SUBJECT TO CONTROL WITHIN AFGHANISTAN ARE BEING FELT HERE AND COULD OFFSET WHAT OTHERWISE WOULD BE GAINS. ANOTHER FACTOR OF FUTURE SUCCESS WILL BE HOW WELL DAUD'S HARD PUSHTUNISTAN LINE CAN BE SUSTAINED AS A POPULAR ISSUE AND WHETHER IT WILL CREATE A CRISIS WITH PAKISTAN (SUCH AS OCCURRED IN THE LAST DAUD REGIME) NEGATING POSITIVE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC PROGRAMS. FINALLY, THERE IS ALSO THE UNRESOLVED PROBLEM OF SUCCESSION, PERHAPS TO BE RESOLVED BY A NEW, SO FAR PROMISED BUT UNPROMULGATED CONSTITUTION. END SUMMARY.

2. PRESIDENT MOHAMMAD DAUD TOOK OVER AS CHIEF EXECUTIVE OF AFGHANISTAN IN JULY 1973. THIS MESSAGE ASSESSES THE PAST YEAR, BUT INEVITABLY IT ASSESSES TOO HIS RULE OVER AFGHANISTAN DURING THE 18 MONTHS SINCE THE COUP WHICH BROUGHT HIM TO POWER.

5. SUCH A STUDY OF THE POLITICAL SITUATION AND THE ACHIEVEMENTS OF AFGHAN LEADERSHIP MUST BEGIN BY CONSIDERING THE FORCES AND PRESSURES WITH WHICH A LEADER HERE MUST CONTEND. AFGHANISTAN IS A BACKWARD COUNTRY WITH MANY ISOLATED COMMUNITIES. IT IS ALSO XENOPHOBIC. THESE FACTORS TEND TO CREATE A SITUATION IN WHICH MANY PEOPLE LIVE IN ABYSMAL IGNORANCE AND UNDER A COMMUNITY LEADERSHIP (TRIBAL/VILLAGE LEVEL) THAT IS SUSPICIOUS OF CHANGE FROM THE OUTSIDE. COMMUNICATIONS ARE POOR. OUTSIDE OF THE MAIN ROAD NET, AFGHANS HEAR NEWS FROM OCCASIONAL TRAVELLERS AND PERHAPS FROM TRANSISTOR RADIOS.

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4. THOUGH THERE HAVE PREVIOUSLY BEEN STRONG RULERS HERE, A CENTRAL GOVERNMENT ARMED WITH ENOUGH POWER TO ENFORCE ITS LEADERSHIP AND DIRECTION THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY IS A RECENT THING, PERHAPS EVEN AS RECENT AS 25 YEARS. THE OVERWHELMING HISTORIC TRADITION HAS BEEN FOR THE KABUL GOVERNMENT TO EXIST IN A STATE OF TENSION WITH SUCH POWER CENTERS AS THE TRIBES, RELIGIOUS ELEMENTS, ETHNIC GROUPINGS, AND ECONOMIC INTERESTS. VARIOUS KINGS AND AMIRS IN THE PAST TRIED TO EXERT INFLUENCE AS A CENTRAL GOVERNMENT THROUGH A COMBINATION OF SUBSIDIES AND PLAYING OFF ONE POWER ELEMENT AGAINST ANOTHER, BUT UNTIL THE ADVENT OF A MODERN ARMY FULL CONTROL WAS NOT POSSIBLE, OR WAS AT BEST ONLY FLEETING. MOHAMMAD DAOUD IS USUALLY GIVEN CREDIT FOR CREATING AFGHANISTAN'S NEW ARMY, FROM HIS 1953-1963 PREMIERSHIP.

5. A PRESIDENT LIKE DAOUD -- A STRONG, WILLFUL EXECUTIVE WHO, WE BELIEVE, WANTS TO MODERNIZE HIS COUNTRY, MUST COPE WITH THE FORCES DESCRIBED ABOVE TO EFFECT CHANGE. HE MUST STRENGTHEN THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT. HE MUST BE "TRUE AFGHAN" IN A LAND WHERE MANY PEOPLE STILL THINK OF THEMSELVES AS "TAJIK" OR "HAZARA" OR AS MEMBERS OF ONE OF SEVERAL OTHER ETHNIC GROUPS. HE MUST FOSTER CHANGE, A MONUMENTAL TASK WITHOUT DISRUPTING THE FUNDAMENTAL COHESION OF A COUNTRY WHERE FAMILY AND PERSONAL RELATIONSHIPS PLAY A KEY ROLE IN THE FABRIC OF NATIONAL COHESION. DAOUD'S PROBLEM IS TO MOVE A NATION WHICH WANTS A VAGUELY-DEFINED PROGRESS, BUT RESISTS CHANGE.

6. AFGHANISTAN'S JULY 1973 COUP D'ETAT EXCHANGED A KNOWN QUANTITY, THAT OF AN INEFFICIENT AND LACKADAISICAL TRADITIONAL "MONARCHY" AFGHAN STYLE, FOR A "REPUBLICAN" REGIME DOMINATED BY VIRTUALLY THE SAME MOHAMMADZAI OLIGARCHY WHICH HAS MANAGED AFGHANISTAN FOR GENERATIONS. A 1970'S VERSION OF DAOUD'S NO-NONSENSE, HEAD-CRACKING PREMIERSHIP OF THE PERIOD 1953-1963 WAS INTRODUCED, THIS TIME CLOAKED IN REPUBLICAN RHETORIC BUT WITH DAOUD EVEN MORE FIRMLY IN THE SADDLE THAN BEFORE. THERE WAS TO BE THIS TIME NO CONSTITUTION, AT LEAST FOR A WHILE, NO PARLIAMENT AND NO ROYAL COURT, INSTITUTIONS WHICH IN THE RECENT PAST WERE CONCEDED BY VIRTUALLY EVERYONE TO HAVE FAILED IN BRINGING ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT.

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7. STAKES WERE HIGH. DEVELOPMENTAL PROGRAMS WHICH HAD NOT BEEN ACCOMPLISHED UNDER THE OLD REGIME SEEMED TO BECOME MORE POSSIBLE IN A SITUATION WHERE DRIVE AND URGENCY AND RUTHLESSNESS WERE THERE TO BE HAD, CREATED BY A MAN OF ENORMOUS REPUTATION FROM HIS PAST REGIME WHO HAD, BESIDES MEMBERSHIP IN THE FULING MOHAM ADZAI FAMILY, INSTANTING SUPPORT FROM THE AFGHAN MILITARY. THE PROSPECTIVE GAIN WAS AN ENHANCED ABILITY TO MODERNIZE THIS COUNTRY, AMONG THE POOREST OF COUNTRIES, AT A MUCH FASTER CLIP.

8. IT IS STILL TOO EARLY TO TELL WHETHER THE SHIFT FROM MONARCHY TO DAQUD AUTOCRACY HAS BEEN A NET PLUS IN AN ENVIRONMENT WHERE CHANGE IS OFTEN IMPERCEPTIBLE AND EVEN GREAT CHANGES ARE OBSCURED BEHIND WALLS OF RETICENCE. IT MAY BE YEARS BEFORE A SCORECARD CAN BE WRITTEN. A GREAT DEAL OF ORGANIZATIONAL WORK, THINKING AND PLANNING HAS HOWEVER BEEN GOING ON QUIETLY, AND WITH THE PROMISE OF SUBSTANTIAL FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE FROM ABROAD, IT IS ENTIRELY

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POSSIBLE THAT MAJOR ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS
WILL BE ENERGIZED IN 1975.

9. IF THE EXPERIMENT CAN BE MADE TO PAY ONLY AS PRESIDENT
DAUD SUCCEEDS IN GAINING VIRTUALLY ALL POWER, THEN 1974 WAS
A PROMISING YEAR, FOR CLEARLY HE CONSOLIDATED HIS HOLD OVER
AFGHANISTAN. AT THE END OF THE YEAR IT COULD BE SAID THAT
THE PRESIDENT KNEW OF, OR WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR, MOST OF THE
SIGNIFICANT DECISIONS AND ACTIONS IN THE COUNTRY.

10. 1974 APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN A YEAR OF CONSOLIDATION AND
PLANNING FOR THE FUTURE, AND THERE APPEARED ON THE SURFACE
LITTLE CHANGE IN AFGHANISTAN'S INTERNAL SITUATION. THIS
INCLUDES LITTLE PERCEPTIBLE PROGRESS IN BRINGING SOME OF
THE BASIC QUESTIONS WHICH THE JULY 1973 REVOLUTION RAISED
FOR AFGHAN POLITICS, SUCH AS HOW IN THE CASE OF A CONST-

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ITUTION POWER CAN BE TRANSFERRED AND WHAT, IF ANY, ARE THE LIMITATIONS UPON GOVERNMENT'S POWER.

11. WHETHER THIS SEEMING LACK OF DYNAMISM POSES A PERIL TO AFGHANISTAN'S CONTINUING STABILITY IS HARD TO JUDGE. AFGHANS ARE NOT ACCUSTOMED TO RAPID CHANGE, YET THE REPUBLICAN REVOLUTION RAISED THEIR EXPECTATIONS. DADUD'S STYLE IS TO MOVE SLOWLY AND CAREFULLY, LINING UP ALL HIS DUCKS IN A ROW BEFORE FIRING, BUT HOW MUCH TIME DOES HE AT AGE 65 HAVE? IF, AS WE SUSPECT WILL BE THE CASE, HIS REGIME BEGINS TO SHOW PROGRESS IN THE DEVELOPMENTAL FIELD, THEN HE WILL HAVE BOUGHT TIME TO RESOLVE UNDERLYING POLITICAL QUESTIONS. IF FAVORABLE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS ARE SLOW TO MATERIALIZE, THEN THE HARD POLITICAL QUESTIONS WILL BECOME MORE PRESSING.

12. IN THE CHANGING C

THE YEAR THERE COULD BE DISCERNED A FAINT PATTERN OF "LEFTIST" DISPOSSESSION AND REPLACEMENT FROM THE "CENTER". ONE SHOULD TAKE CARE, HOWEVER, NOT TO SET TOO GREAT STORE BY THESE DESIGNATIONS. IT IS MISLEADING TO STUFF AFGHAN PUBLIC FIGURES INTO A NON-AFGHAN MOLD. THE "RIGHT-LEFT" LABEL AT ONCE MEANS TOO LITTLE AND TOO MUCH...IT DOES TOO LITTLE IN TERMS OF RELATING A PERSON TO THE INTRICACIES OF AFGHAN POLITICS, WHICH ARE STILL ESSENTIALLY "GODFATHERLY" -- PERSONAL AND FAMILIAL; AND IT DOES TOO MUCH IN ATTRIBUTING TO THAT PERSON AN IDEOLOGY OF WHICH HE MAY HAVE BUT THE FLIMSIEST KNOWLEDGE AND A PATTERN OF LOYALTIES TO WHICH HE MAY HAVE BUT FAINTEST ATTACHMENT. IF THE LEFT-RIGHT SPECTRUM MEANS ANYTHING IN THE PURELY INTERNAL AFGHAN CONTEXT IT REFERS TO ATTITUDES TOWARD GOVERNMENT CONTROL THROUGHOUT THE SOCIETY, WITH THE "LEFTISTS," LIKE LIBERAL WESTERN OR SOVIET EDUCATED AFGHANS FAVORING CENTRAL GOVERNMENT CONTROL AS OPPOSED TO ISLAMIC AND TRIBAL "RIGHTISTS" HOSTILE TO ANY GOVERNMENT AUTHORITY WHICH THEY PERCEIVE AS A THREAT TO MOSLEM AND TRIBAL FOLKWAYS AND THEIR OWN POWER.

13. THOUGH FACILE SOBRIQUETS ARE RISKY, CHANGES IN GOVERNMENT IN 1974 COULD POINT TO LESSENING OF "LEFTIST" OR PRO-SOVIET INFLUENCE: IN MARCH THE "LEFTIST" PACHA GUL WAS REMOVED FROM HIS POST AS MINISTER OF FRONTIER AFFAIRS AND SENT AS AMBASSADOR TO BULGARIA; IN APRIL THE MINISTER OF COMMUNIC-

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ATIONS, ABDUL HAMID MOHAT, WAS REMOVED FROM BOTH CENTRAL COMMITTEE AND CABINET. E b-6

PAZHWAQ FAMILY WERE REMOVED FROM JOBS AS MINISTER OF EDUCATION AND GOVERNOR OF HELMAND PROVINCE. FINALLY, ON THE LAST DAY OF 1974 IT WAS ANNOUNCED THAT THE "LEFTIST" RECTOR OF KABUL UNIVERSITY, SAOHAMMAD HAIDAR, HAD BEEN SACKED FOR INEFFICIENCY ALONG WITH HIS ACADEMIC COLLEAGUE, HABIBBUR RAHMAN, DEPUT RECTOR AT THE RUSSIAN-BUILT AND SUPPORTED POLYTECHNIC INSTITUTE. b-6 b-1 ED

15. THOUGH THESE SHIFTS AND REMOVALS INDICATE A WEAKENING OF THE INFLUENCE OF THE "LEFTIST" WING OF THE GOVERNMENT, 1974 ALSO SAW GOVERNMENT ACTIONS CLEARLY MEANT TO WARN AND INTIMIDATE EXTREME ISLAMIC "RIGHTISTS" WHOSE HOSTILITY TOWARD DAQUD DATES FROM HIS TENURE AS PRIME MINISTER. IN MID-AUGUST THE GOA ANNOUNCED THAT 13 PERSONS, ALL WITH STRONG TIES TO MOSLEM ORGANIZATIONS OR RANKING DIVINES, HAD BEEN TRIED AND CONVICTED BY MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR UNSPECIFIED ACTS OF TERRORISM AND ESPIONAGE. ONE PERSON WAS EXECUTED, THE OTHERS GIVEN VARYING PRISON SENTENCES. b-6 b-1 ED

16. AGAIN, HOWEVER, IT WOULD BE WRONG TO INTERPRET THESE EVENTS IN IDEOLOGICAL TERMS, AS JUST COUNTERMOVES TO THE "LEFT." THE REAL PATTERN WAS SIMPLY "DAQUD-WARD." RATHER THAN BEING INTENDED AS MOVES TO THE "RIGHT" OR "LEFT" THE REMOVAL OF MINISTERS OR THE SUPPRESSION OF "COUNTER COUPS" WAS MORE LIKELY THE SIMPLE REMOVAL OF PERCEIVED ACTUAL OR POTENTIAL THREATS TO DAQUD'S POWER.

17. DAQUD APPEARS TO HAVE EXTENDED HIS CONTROL OVER THE CABINET, WHICH REPRESENTS THE GOVERNMENT AND BUREAUCRACY'S

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PUBLIC FACE, AND ALSO OVER THE RATHER MYSTERIOUS "CENTRAL COMMITTEE" WITH WHICH DAUD RODE TO POWER AND WHICH COULD HAVE POSES AN OBSTACLE TO HIS CONTROL. WHILE THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE IS STILL MENTIONED IN MEDIA TREATMENT OF CEREMONIAL EVENTS, FIGURES AS A TARGET FOR ISLAMIC CONSERVATIVES, AND IS A PERENNIAL SUBJECT OF BAZAAR RUMOR, THERE IS LITTLE INDICATION THAT IT PLAYS AN IMPORTANT ROLE IN THE POLICIES OF THE GOVERNMENT.

18. THE MAIN INSTRUMENT OF THE DAUD REGIME IS THE COUNTRY'S ARMED FORCES, FOR WHOSE MODERNIZATION AND LEADERSHIP HE HAS BEEN RESPONSIBLE, EXCEPT FOR 1963-1973 FOR OVER THIRTY YEARS. IN ADDITION TO THE UNDENIABLE IMPROVEMENTS DAUD HAS MADE IN THE ARMED FORCES, IMPROVEMENTS WHICH HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO THE STATUS AND WELL-BEING OF THE OFFICER CORPS AS WELL AS TO THE COUNTRY, THESE ORGANIZATIONS ARE ALSO MODERN BASTIONS OF POWER FOR HIS MOHAMMADZAI AND OTHER PUSHTUN KINSMEN. THE OFFICER CORPS IS LARGELY THUS DOUBLY BEHOLDEN. SHAKEUPS IN THE COMMAND STRUCTURE, ESPECIALLY IN THE AIR FORCE, MAY HAVE WEAKENED THE ORGANIZATION, BUT THEY MAY HAVE ENHANCED DAUD'S CONTROL.

19. WITHIN THE MILITARY THERE HAVE BEEN REPORTS OF INFIGHTING AMONG PERSONALITIES, MOST PARTICULARLY A SPAT BETWEEN GENERAL MOSTAGHNI, CHIEF OF THE GENERAL STAFF, AND GENERAL HAIDER, COMMANDER OF THE CENTRAL ARMY FORCES. THE FEUD WAS REPORTEDLY KEPT FROM GETTING SERIOUS THROUGH INTERCESSION BY DAUD HIMSELF, BUT IT COULD BE A CAUSE OF TROUBLE IN THE FUTURE. MEANWHILE WE ARE NOT AWARE THAT ANY MILITARY FIGURE OF TOWERING STATURE HAS DEVELOPED THAT MIGHT POSE A THREAT TO PRESIDENT DAUD'S CONTROL OVER THE ARMED FORCES. THERE ARE OF COURSE POSSIBILITIES OF "SOME COLONEL" OR SOME "CABAL OF OFFICERS" (THOSE NIGHTMARES OF STRONG NEW REGIMES) BECOMING TROUBLESOME, BUT CERTAINLY FROM THE EMBASSY'S "LOOKING THROUGH A GLASS DARKLY" AS BEST WE CAN AT THE RUSSIAN-TRAINED AND HIGHLY SECRETIVE AFGHAN

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ARMED FORCES, WE SEE NO PRESENT PROSPECTS FOR DAOUD'S
LOSS OF CONTROL.

20. AVAILABLE ALSO AS A TOOL FOR MAINTENANCE OF THE DAOUD
REGIME IS THE SHADOWY "DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC PROTECTION,"
THE FORMER "ZAST-E-AMALAT," A DAOUD CREATION FROM THE
1950'S. ESTIMATES OF ITS PERSONNEL STRENGTH RUN AS HIGH AS
90,000. ITS STRUCTURE IS SHROUDED IN MYSTERY AND (PROBABLY
DELIBERATE) CONFUSION. WHAT IS NOT DOUBTED IS DAOUD'S
MASTERY OVER THIS SECRET POLICE AND NETWORK OF INFORMERS,
AND HIS ABILITY TO USE IT AS HIS PERSONAL WEAPON IN DEALING
WITH ANYONE WHO WOULD UNSEAT HIM.

21. WE ARE LEFT TO SPECULATE WHAT LEVERS OF POWER IN FACT
THE PRESIDENT DOES NOT CONTROL. ALTHOUGH IT IS DIFFICULT
TO SUBSTANTIATE, IT APPEARS THAT ANY SUCH UNSUBJUGATED POWER
EXIST: ONLY AMONG THE FLEDGLING BANKING AND COMMERCIAL ELITE

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IN KABUL AND AMONG THE TRADITIONAL PROVINCIAL ELITES..THE GREAT KHANS AND SARDARS, THE RELIGIOUS NETWORK, THE MONEYED FARMERS, THE ETHNIC BIG GUNS OF THE DISPARATE AREAS. THESE ELEMENTS, HOWEVER, DO NOT APPEAR TO POSE ANY THREAT TO THE POWER OF A MAN WHO HAS GRASPED ALL THAT AFGHANISTAN HOLDS & WAY OF MODERN MILITARY, ADMINISTRATIVE AND BUREAUCRATIC MACHINERY.

22. IT IS HARD TO KNOW WHAT PRECISELY, PRESIDENT DAODU WANTS TO DO WITH ALL THIS POWER ON THE DOMESTIC FRONT. HE IS, TO BE SURE, AN AFGHAN PATRIOT WHO SEEKS THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE NATION. BUT HERE THERE IS ROOM FOR AMBIGUITY: TO WHAT DEGREE IS "AFGHAN" STILL SYNONYMOUS WITH PUSHTUN? IS DEVELOPMENT TO BE DESIRED IF IT BITES TOO DEEPLY AT MOHAMMAD-ZAI POWER? HE IS HORTATIVE; HE IS NATIONIST; HE IS "NON-IDEOLOGICAL "; HE DEMANDS "SACRIFICE" FOR THE PURPOSE OF NATIONBUILDING; HE IS (WITH CONSIDERABLE REPETITION) "MOSLEM." HE IS SUPERB AT "PRESIDENTIAL" SPEECHES THE PURPOSE OF WHICH IS TO INVOKE HIGH IDEALS, INADEQUATE AT "PRIME MINISTERIAL" SPEECHES, DURING WHICH HE OFFERS FEW SPECIFIC STATEMENTS ABOUT HOW THIS COUNTRY IS TO BE GOVERNED.

23. ON THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT SIDE, DAODU HAS SPECIFIC IDEAS, AS MIGHT HAVE BEEN EXPECTED GIVEN HIS STRONG HISTORICAL INTEREST IN DEVELOPMENT. IN HIS FIRST "JESHYN DAY" SPEECH (IN AUGUST 1973, SHORTLY AFTER HE TOOK POWER) THE PRESIDENT OUTLINED WITH SOME PRECISION A COMPREHENSIVE SET OF DEVELOPMENT GOALS. ALTHOUGH IN THE MONTHS SINCE WE HAVE WITNESSED THE USUAL AFGHAN DIFFICULTY IN "GETTING IT ALL TOGETHER" FOR CONCRETE ACTION, WE HAVE SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE FROM GOA STATEMENTS AND OUR DISCUSSIONS WITH GOA OFFICIALS TO KNOW THAT THE AUGUST 1973 OUTLINES REMAINS A FIRM POLICY DOCUMENT, AND THAT PLANNING IS PROCEEDING ON SPECIFIC PROJECTS, RANGING FROM RAILROADS AND MINES TO IRRIGATION SCHEMES AND NEW FACTORIES, WITH FOREIGN DONORS AND TECHNICIANS BEING LINED UP TO ASSIST.

24. SINCE HIS FIRST ANNIVERSARY ADDRESS" IN JULY, 1974 IN WHICH HE SPOKE AT LENGTH ABOUT HIS REA FOR DISSATISFACTION WITH THE 1964 CONSTITUTION, AND, BY IMPLICATION, HIS THOUGHTS ABOUT A BETTER CONSTITUTIONAL FORMAT, DAODU'S

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"POLITICAL" TALKS HAVE BEEN FEW. THERE ARE RUMORS IN GOVERNMENT CIRCLES THAT A NEW CONSTITUTION IS BEING PREPARED. ITS PREPARATION (IF IN FACT IT IS IN PREPARATION) IS SHROUDED IN SECRECY. THERE HAS BEEN NO PUBLIC DEBATE. EVEN SHOULD A FINISHED TEXT AT SOME POINT EMERGE AND GO TO "LOYA JIRAH" (TRIBAL ASSEMBLY) AS DID THE 1964 CONSTITUTION, IT SEEMS POSSIBLE THAT THE VERY ACT OF APPROVING A NEW TEXT DICTATED FROM ABOVE, AFTER THE SOLEMNITY AND WEIGHT OF THE . 34 DELIBERATIONS, WILL CONTRIBUTE TO A NOTION THAT THIS IS, AFTER ALL, BUT A HANDBOOK FOR THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE DAOUD REGIME. WHETHER IT WILL SERVE TO GUIDE THE FUTURE AND PROVIDE FOR THE GREATEST OF EXIGENCIES, THAT OF SUCCESSION, WILL OF COURSE DEPEND ON THE CIRCUMSTANCES (AND TIMING) OF THAT SUCCESSION.

25. THERE ARE WEAKNESSES INHERENT IN A SITUATION WHEREIN THE AFGHAN GOVERNMENT RIDES UPON THE SHOULDERS OF ONE MAN, GUIDED IN EVERY SIGNIFICANT WAY BY HIM AND A VERY LIMITED NUMBER OF ADVISORS. THE REGIME'S HALLMARK TO DATE HAS BEEN AUTHORITARIANISM. IT HAS FED UPON UNCERTAINTY AND IT HAS GENERATED FEAR DELIBERATELY IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN THIS. AUTHORITARIANISM FED UPON SECRECY AND UNCERTAINTY HAS TENDED TO FREEZE (WHERE THERE ARE CHOICES TO BE MADE) EVEN MOST SENIOR CIVIL SERVANTS INTO INACTIVITY. THE SYSTEM IS TOTALLY RELIANT UPON THE ONE MAN AT THE TOP FOR LEGITIMATE AUTHORITY. HAVING AS ITS TOUCHSTONE LOYALTY TO DAOUD THE REGIME HAS VIRTUALLY NO LEADERSHIP OTHER THAN THAT WHICH HE CAN PROVIDE. HE IN TURN FINDS IT ALMOST IMPOSSIBLE TO ACCOMPLISH ALL THE TASKS HE HAS TAKEN TO HIMSELF. THE REGIME'S INABILITY OR UNWILLINGNESS TO UTILIZE THE TALENTS OF PEOPLE WHO HAVE NOT SUCCEEDED IN DEMONSTRATING THEIR PERSONAL LOYALTY TO DAOUD HINDERS EFFORTS TO BEING EFFICIENCY TO GOVERNMENT.

26. YET THE LINCHPIN IN DAOUD'S SUSTAINABILITY AND ACCEPTANCE BY THE BODY PUBLIC SEEMS TO BE TO WHAT DEGREE HE SUCCEEDED IN MOVING THE NATION TOWARD RENEWED ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT. TO ACCOMPLISH THIS, HE MUST OVERCOME SOME MAJOR AND MANY MINOR DEVELOPMENT CONSTRAINTS, THE MOST PERCEPTIBLE AND STIFLING BEING A SLUGGISH, UNRESPONSIVE AND RELATIVELY UNTRAINED GOVERNMENT BUREAUCRACY. THIS, IN TURN, WILL REQUIRE INSTILLING CONFIDENCE AND A SENSE OF JOB SECURITY IN THIS

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BUREAUCRACY, REWARDING THOSE WHO SHOW INITIATIVE AND EFFICIENCY; IT ALSO REQUIRES DRAWING ON THE SMALL BUT EXTANT CORPS OF TRAINED AFGHAN TECHNOCRATS, BOTH IN AND OUT OF THE GOVERNMENT, TO SEIZE THE OPPORTUNITIES WHICH ARE APPARENT FROM THE NEWLY-FOUND SOURCES OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT FUNDING EMANATING FROM THE MORE AFFLUENT MOSLEM COUNTRIES.

27. THERE ARE FLEETING SIGNS THAT SOME MEMBERS OF THE DAOUD TEAM ARE BECOMING AWARE OF THE NEED TO SEIZE THE DAY ECONOMICALLY. THUS FAR, THE GOVERNMENT HAS MANAGED TO STEM ANY GROUNDSWELL OF ECONOMIC DISCONTENT LARGELY THROUGH A PRICE STABILIZATION PROGRAM FOR BASIC COMMODITIES. THE EFFECTS OF WORLDWIDE INFLATION AND SHORTAGES, HOWEVER, ARE JUST BEGINNING TO HIT AFGHANISTAN. THE GOVERNMENT'S ABILITY TO COPE WITH ECONOMICS WILL BE ONE OF THE CRITICAL ELEMENTS IN ITS VIABILITY.

28. FINALLY, ALTHOUGH THIS IS A SUBJECT CONSIDERED IN DETAIL IN A SEPTEL ON AFGHANISTAN'S FOREIGN RELATIONS PROBLEMS, THERE IS THE DAOUD HARD LINE TOWARD PUSHTUNISTAN. THE DAOUD "PUSHTUNISTAN POLICY" -- PROBABLY AIMED AT NOTHING MORE THAN KEEPING THE ISSUE ALIVE, NOT TOWARD ANY RESOLUTION -- IS THE ISSUE WHICH COST HIM HIS PREMIERSHIP IN 1963, AS THE CONFRONTATION WITH PAKISTAN AND SUBSEQUENT BORDER CLOSING AT THAT TIME THESE CAUSED DISLOCATIONS IN THE AFGHAN ECONOMY AND HOMEFRONT DISCONTENT WHICH MADE DAOUD'S POSITION UNTENABLE. QUITE APART FROM PAKISTANI IRE THAT THIS RENEWED "FORWARD POLICY" BY THE DAOUD GOVERNMENT HAS CAUSED, IS CAUSING AND WILL CAUSE THERE ALSO ARE WAYS IT COULD BECOME AGAIN A DOMESTICALLY CONTENTIOUS ISSUE. EVEN NOW A SMALL ANTI-DAOUD GROUP CLAIMING PAN-ISLAMIC SYMPATHIES HAS CHOSEN TO TRY AND EXPLOIT THE ISSUE. THIS IS OF DOUBIOUS LASTING CONSEQUENCE, BUT WHAT WOULD NOT BE ARE POLICIES SO EXTREME AS ACTUALLY TO CAUSE DISRUPTIONS IN AFGHANISTAN'S ECONOMY OR PUT REAL FEAR INTO POLITICALLY AWARE PEOPLE OF AN ARMED CLASH WITH PAKISTAN. IT APPEARS HOWEVER THAT A NUMBER OF PERSONS TRUSTED BY DAOUD, MOST NOTABLY HIS BROTHER NAIM, HAVE SERIOUS RESERVATIONS ABOUT ATTEMPTS TO BRING THIS ISSUE TO CRISIS PROPORTIONS.

29. IN CONCLUSION, WE SEE A REGIME LED BY AN AUTOCRATIC MAN WHO IS TRYING -- USING UNIQUELY AFGHAN METHODS -- TO

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MODERNIZE HIS COUNTRY. HIS STRENGTHS ARE IN HIS CONTROL
OF THE MACHINERY OF GOVERNMENT. HIS MAIN HANDICAPS ARE
THOSE INHERENT IN A BACKWARD, XENOPHOBIC COUNTRY AND IN
AUTHORITARIANISM, THE UNCERTAINTIES OF ECONOMICS, AND,
THE WEAKNESS AND INEXPERIENCE OF HIS GOVERNING MECHANISM
IN IMPLEMENTING A NEW ORDER FOR AFGHANISTAN.
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